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Debts in sentence

1153 examples of Debts in a sentence

The much larger deficits and debts (add several portions of nationalist rhetoric and a generous helping of foreign-policy inexperience to the mix) could easily prompt a surge in risk aversion and a sizeable increase in long-term interest rates – which would undermine much of the rationale behind self-financing infrastructure investments.
It means that some portion of members’ debts will be mutualized: individual governments’ debts would become Eurobonds, and thus a joint obligation of all members.
Mutualizing debts before European institutions have a veto over fiscal policies would only encourage more reckless behavior by national governments.
Ordinary people – like the father of three who was imprisoned in the UK in September 2015 for accumulating £500,000 in gambling debts – do not enjoy such impunity.
Successive waves of QE would amount to debasing the value of the dollar, and thus inflating away massive US debts.
Specifically, they must phase out obsolete supply chains saddled with overcapacity, bad debts, and falling employment, while taxing the winners in the e-commerce game.
It virtually guarantees that Greece, Spain, and others with large private and public debts will be condemned to years of economic decline and high unemployment.
Even government deficit spending – long the bane of Africa – seems positively puny compared to the massive debts that the US and some European countries face.
Its main proponents are creditors, who have much to gain from it (relative to the alternative of raising domestic wages and forgiving debts).
China’s ghost towns and local-government debts are not harbingers of doom.
The only reason the country has not long since defaulted on its debts is that the European Central Bank continues to provide funds to the Greek central bank through its emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) scheme.
Despite all the pain Greece has suffered – a 30% drop in aggregate demand since the last cyclical peak and a rise in unemployment to more than 25% of the workforce – the Greek economy is still nowhere near competitive enough to repay its debts.
But allowing Greece to default and still remain in the eurozone is not an option: it would signal that other eurozone countries could amass huge debts, funded by the ECB, without having any intention of repaying.
In return, its creditors would agree to another one-time debt write-off – large enough to enable Greece realistically to repay its debts in the future, but small enough to avoid unnecessary transfers of credit.
Under this program, creditor countries would write off Greece’s debts, on the condition that the country left the eurozone voluntarily.
The problem, of course, lies in sluggish economic growth, which undermines wage growth, weakens tax revenues, and makes it impossible for governments to pay down their debts.
President Clinton, indeed, announced 100% cancellation of debts owed to the U.S. by the poorest countries.
Back in 2003, partly in response to the Argentine crisis, the IMF proposed a new framework for adjudicating sovereign debts.
But with the largest economies, nearly eight years after the global financial crisis, burdened by high and rising levels of public and private debts, it is baffling that comprehensive restructuring does not figure prominently among the menu of policy options.
In the early stages of the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Kenneth Rogoff and I noted that recovery from severe financial crises are protracted affairs, as it takes time for households and firms to work down the debts accumulated during the boom.
This meant that as the ruble depreciated, Russia’s debts rose.
They have recognized that austerity will mean slower growth – indeed, a recession is increasingly likely – and that, without growth, the eurozone’s distressed countries will not be able to manage their debts.
Falling prices mean that the real cost of capital is high and the real value of nominal debts rise, leading to further declines in consumption and investment – and thus setting in motion a vicious circle in which incomes and jobs are squeezed further, aggravating the fall in demand and prices.
There was also excess in the securitized products that converted these debts into toxic financial derivatives; in borrowing by local governments; in financing for leveraged buyouts that should never have occurred; in corporate bonds that will now suffer massive losses in a surge of defaults; in the dangerous and unregulated credit default swap market.
Now, if something similar happens, the central bank will have the foreign exchange needed to service its debts while maintaining a stable exchange rate.
Asian countries increased their dollar debts markedly during this period, as they experienced a strong expansion of investment and production.
This incited deflation in dollar-export prices of -5% in 1997 followed by a swing in real interest rates on dollar debts from -4% in 1995 to 10.5% in 1997, ie by 14.5%.
The Ukrainian Government is broke, and will most likely have to default, or to reschedule its foreign debts, or to borrow new funds to repay the old, in 2000.
But in the post-crisis downswing, accumulated debts have a powerful depressive effect, because over-leveraged businesses and consumers cut investment and consumption in an attempt to pay down their debts.
Because slower growth forces them to borrow new money to pay their maturing debts, interest rates are bid up, and businesses in the real economy are crowded out, creating a further drag on growth.
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