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Debts in sentence

1153 examples of Debts in a sentence

But as debts mount, and global interest rates rise, investors will become rightly nervous about the risk of debt restructuring.
Optimists claim that most emerging economies are well prepared to withstand the shock, because their dollar debts are lower than in the past, while their fiscal positions are much stronger.
But in emerging economies with substantial dollar debts – whether private or public – devaluation raises the cost of outstanding debt (when measured in domestic currency) and can wreak havoc with balance sheets and creditworthiness.
While emerging markets have reduced their dollar debts, they have not done so sufficiently to reassure markets.
Losses can result from excessive wages paid by the ESM Governing Council members to themselves, a dearth of energy in efforts to collect debts from countries that have received credit, or other forms of mismanagement.
A more fundamental question is causality: the state of the economy certainly affects the fiscal position, just as taxation, spending, deficits, and debts may affect economic growth.
Falling prices mean a rise in the real value of existing debts and an increase in the debt-service burden, owing to higher real interest rates.
There is excess capacity in some heavy industries and in residential real-estate markets in some second- and third-tier cities.Local governments have significant debts that were incurred at the request of the central government in 2007 and 2008 in order to avoid a serious economic downturn.
The growing gap between mortgage debts and house prices will continue to increase the rate of defaults.
Many EU countries were vulnerable because they had accumulated excessive and unnecessary public debts by maintaining budget deficits during the pre-crisis boom years.
Indeed, a senior cabinet minister suggested recently that the international community should write off Pakistan’s debts – an amount estimated at $40 billion.
Credit growth has already fallen close to zero in many countries and is contracting in many others as debts levels are reduced for households and companies.
Thus, it is now subject to the discourse of economic orthodoxy, which, in insisting that all debts be paid to the penny, ignores that public spending is also an engine of growth.
In Mexico in 1995, in East Asia in 1997-1998, and in Argentina in 2002, the collapse of currency values caused enormous distress: as exchange rates fell, the local-currency value of debts owed to foreigners and linked in value to the dollar soared, raising the danger of effective national bankruptcy.
Like Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina, America's international debts are largely denominated in US dollars.
Unlike other countries, a decline in the real value of the dollar reduces the real value of America's gross international debts.
The currency crises in Mexico, East Asia, and Argentina primarily impoverished workers who lost their jobs, those whose hard-currency debts suddenly ballooned, and rich-country investors who found themselves renegotiating terms with insolvent borrowers.
So resolving the bad debts would involve transferring the losses from the state-owned banks to the government.
If necessary, it could also deal with the excess debts that local governments, encouraged by the central authorities, incurred in 2008 and 2009.
Third, not only is fixed income more illiquid, but now most of these instruments – which have grown enormously in number, owing to the mushrooming issuance of private and public debts before and after the financial crisis – are held in open-ended funds that allow investors to exit overnight.
But a hard landing becomes more likely in 2013, as the stimulus fades, non-performing loans rise, the investment bust accelerates, and the problem of rolling over the debts of provincial governments and their special investment vehicles can no longer be papered over.
If a country is bankrupt, it must let its creditors know that it cannot repay its debts.
The real depreciation necessary to restore external balance would drive the real value of euro debts even higher, making them even more unsustainable.
Lowering private and public consumption in order to boost private savings, and implementing fiscal austerity to reduce private and public debts, aren’t options, either.
The only alternative is to shift quickly to Plan B – an orderly restructuring and reduction of the debts of these countries’ governments, households, and banks.
One can carry out an orderly rescheduling of the PIIGS’ public debts without actually reducing the principal amount owed.
This means extending the maturity dates of debts and reducing the interest rate on the new debt to levels much lower than currently unsustainable market rates.
Ultimately, that means guaranteeing the eurozone’s survival with Germany’s economic might and assets: unlimited acquisition of the crisis countries’ government bonds by the European Central Bank, Europeanization of national debts via Eurobonds, and growth programs to avoid a eurozone depression and boost recovery.
The key is to lower interest rates enough to mitigate the financial risks of high leverage and enable the restructuring of local-government debts.
The ESM is a sure way to bring Europe to its knees, because the longer bailout loans continue, the longer the GIPS’ current-account deficits will persist, and the more their external debts will grow.
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