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Debtors in sentence

238 examples of Debtors in a sentence

Faced with that risk, creditors demand higher interest rates from the outset or refuse to grant additional credit, thereby imposing a measure of discipline on debtors.
All negotiations between debtors and creditors involve bluff and bluster to some extent.
And yet the Bundesbank’s Target claims are essentially worthless, because they can never be called due and are issued at an interest rate determined by the debtors, which hold the majority on the ECB Governing Council.
The 1840’s were a period of slow growth, and continued pressure from foreign creditors forced most of the official debtors to resume payments after a while.
Unfortunately the euro crisis transformed the EU into something radically different: a relationship of creditors and debtors in which the creditor countries impose conditions that perpetuate their dominance.
Having portrayed the eurozone crisis not as a problem of interdependence, but as a morality tale – thrifty, hard-working Germans pitted against profligate, duplicitous debtors – German politicians will not have an easy time bringing their voters along on any common fiscal project.
When the 2005 bankruptcy law was passed, lenders were the beneficiaries; they didn’t worry about how the law affected the rights of debtors.
Mutual resentment between creditors and debtors is liable to grow, and there is a real danger that the euro may destroy the EU’s political and social cohesion.
This deflation is bad, it is argued, because it makes it harder for debtors, especially in the troubled economies of the eurozone's periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain), to pay what they owe.
What matters for debt-service capacity is the debtors' income, not the general price level.
Thanks to European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech, new financial facilities to stabilize distressed sovereign debtors, and the beginning of a banking union, the eurozone is no longer on the verge of collapse.
In the 1990’s, emerging-market crises were first and foremost currency crises: sharp corrections of overvalued currencies that bankrupted public and private sector debtors.
We believe a critical opportunity was missed when the balance of the burden of adjustment was tilted heavily in favor of creditors relative to debtors in the response to the crisis and that this contributed to the prolonged stagnation that followed the crisis.
In antiquity, the conflicts between creditors and debtors often turned violent, as the alternative to debt relief was slavery.
In today’s Europe, the conflict between creditors and debtors takes a more civilized form, seen only in European Council resolutions and internal ECB discussions.
The euro’s long-run survival requires the correct mix of adjustment by debtors, debt forgiveness where this is not enough, and bridge financing to convince nervous financial markets that the debtors will have the time needed for adjustment to work.
Most of the big Latin American debtors took extraordinary pains to avoid an explicit default.
Fisher's criticism, however, was even more devastating--and more relevant to Japan's current circumstances: as prices fall, debtors, whose obligations are fixed in nominal terms (that is, in terms of yen) find it increasingly difficult to repay what they owe.
Some debtors default--the debtor problems then become the banks' problem--while others are forced to cut back their expenditures, deepening the downturn.
Higher prices would make debtors better off, and they might as a result begin to spend more.
More debtors would be able to repay their loans, which might lead the banks to lend more.
But Germany’s thrifty savers – households, banks, and insurance companies – are furious about ECB policies that tax them (and others in the eurozone core) to subsidize the eurozone periphery’s alleged reckless spenders and debtors.
Creditor-debtor conflicts have always been the stuff of monetary politics, and the persistence of austerity has set the stage for a new debtors’ revolt.
(In the eurozone, it should be noted, arguments for fiscal austerity were also fueled by mistrust among governments, with creditor countries demanding that debtors endure some pain in exchange for “gains” like bailouts.)
But the proposal faced sharp opposition not only from creditors who feared that the IMF would be too friendly to problem debtors, but also from emerging markets that foresaw no near-term risk to their perceived creditworthiness.
In fact, the panicked selling of Asian currencies only began to subside when the Asian debtors (mainly private banks and corporations) actually suspended debt payments, and began to negotiate a formal roll over of these loans.
Direct negotiations between creditors and debtors, rather than IMF bailouts, is the most effective approach to this.
Griesa’s ruling, however, encourages usurious behavior, threatens the functioning of international financial markets, and defies a basic tenet of modern capitalism: insolvent debtors need a fresh start.
If the IMF were to ease the terms on its Greek loans, it would likely face fierce protests from its less wealthy debtors and risk compromising its status as senior creditor – an outcome that even the Fund’s largely quiescent Board of Governors is unlikely to accept.
Distressed debtors need a fresh start.
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