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Currency in sentence

4390 examples of Currency in a sentence

But all of the options that might restore competitiveness require real currency depreciation.
A return to a national currency and a sharp depreciation would quickly restore competitiveness and growth.
Allowing the currency to appreciate will help to offset those pressures and restrain price growth.
The Americans are eager for China to reduce its surplus and allow its currency to appreciate more rapidly.
Slowing growth and policy missteps, together with signs that the US Federal Reserve will start tightening monetary policy by scaling back its “quantitative easing” (QE, or open-ended purchases of long-term assets), have triggered deep sell-offs in emerging economies’ currency, bond, and equity markets.
From East Asia to Western Europe, currencies swooned and equity prices tumbled – all because of China’s decision to allow a modest devaluation of its currency, the renminbi.
A new era of currency wars is about to be unleashed, doomsayers chimed in.
And devaluation of the renminbi could be viewed as an aggressive move to reverse the export slide and restore domestic growth – a move that could prompt competitors in Asia and elsewhere to push down their exchange rates as well, triggering an all-out currency war.
The devaluation advanced China’s strategic goal of turning the renminbi into an international reserve currency – and, in the long term, into a credible global challenger to the US dollar.
If the renminbi were added to this group of the world’s leading currencies, it would gain considerable prestige, and central banks would undoubtedly increase their use of the currency as a reserve asset.
According to the IMF, for a currency to be included in the SDR basket, it must meet two key criteria.
But the second criterion – that the currency must be “freely usable” (widely used and widely traded) – has proved to be a major stumbling block.
Given tight government-imposed limits on foreign investors’ renminbi purchases, as well as Chinese investors’ use of renminbi to invest abroad, not many observers would describe the currency as freely usable.
Assuming the PBOC follows through, China can more credibly claim that its currency is freely usable – or at least that it is moving in that direction.
But the IMF has certainly noticed, suggesting that “a more market-determined exchange rate would facilitate SDR operations, in case the renminbi were included in the currency basket going forward.”
While much of the world was distracted by the putative threat of currency wars, China may have found a way to sneak its way into the SDR basket.
As they pursued this agenda, emerging economies experienced stuttering starts and numerous crises, often associated with excessive debt, currency traps, and high inflation.
But talk is cheap, and open-mouth operations have only a temporary effect on the currency.
Markets are already becoming wary; full-blown panic is likely if protectionism and reckless, politicized monetary policy precipitate trade, currency, and capital-control wars.
The causes of the crisis cannot be properly understood without recognizing the euro’s fatal flaw: By creating an independent central bank, member countries have become indebted in a currency that they do not control.
When the Greek crisis raised the specter of default, financial markets reacted with a vengeance, relegating all heavily indebted eurozone members to the status of a Third World country over-extended in a foreign currency.
In 2005, when the US government was pressing China to allow the renminbi to appreciate, Phillip Swagel, a former member of President George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers, wrote: “If China’s currency is undervalued by 27%, as some have claimed, US consumers have been getting a 27% discount on everything made in China, while the Chinese have been paying 27% too much for Treasury bonds.”
Conventional macroeconomists like me look at America’s current-account deficit, now running at 7% of GDP, and know that such vast deficits are inevitably followed by large currency depreciations.
If it falls 60% against China’s currency, the yuan, sometime in the next ten years, US long-term interest rates should be six percentage points higher than Chinese rates.
And, because Turkish banks and firms have borrowed heavily in foreign currency, the lira’s freefall threatens to bring much of the private sector down with it.
Sooner or later, economic pressures will force Turkey to adopt fixes that will stabilize its currency and financial markets.
But many in the US Congress insist that provisions must be added to the agreements to prevent currency manipulation.
Let’s be clear: If the US were to insist that “strong and enforceable currency disciplines” be part of trade agreements, no deals would be concluded.
Linking efforts to prevent currency manipulation to trade agreements has always been a bad idea, and it still is.
But even when currency misalignment is relatively clear, trade agreements are not the right way to address it.
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