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Creditors in sentence

1217 examples of Creditors in a sentence

More interestingly, the report then asks how the Fund should coordinate its operations with regional bodies like the European Commission and the ECB, the other members of the so-called Troika of Greece’s official creditors.
In addition to €130 billion in loans (more than 40% of Greek GDP, on top of the €110 billion loaned to Greece in 2010), a 50% “haircut” has been imposed on Greece’s private creditors, and the European Central Bank has waived expected returns on its holdings of Greek bonds.
Heavy borrowing also encourages owners and managers to go for broke, because it’s the creditors who bear most of the downside risk.
But creditors don’t have an incentive to place tough limits on banks.
European taxpayers would effectively take over the Greek banking system, but this would be partial compensation for the losses imposed on creditors by drachmatization.
The creditors stand to lose large sums should a member state exit the monetary union, yet debtors are subjected to policies that deepen their depression, aggravate their debt burden, and perpetuate their subordinate position.
But Argentina made no friends by waiting four years to negotiate with its creditors and then offering settlement terms that were stingy by the standards of previous debt restructurings.
Still, the terms were acceptable to the vast majority of the country’s creditors, who exchanged their old claims for new ones worth 30 cents on the dollar.
When the tussle between our government and the “Troika” (the European Commission, the European, Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) came to a head, both Sapin and Gabriel adopted the worst and most aggressive elements of the creditors’ propaganda against our government.
This limits losses to stockholders and completely protects almost all creditors.
That point will be reached when saving the big banks, protecting their creditors, and stabilizing the economy plunges the US government so deeply into debt that its solvency is called into question, interest rates rise sharply, and a fiscal crisis erupts.
It was part of the standard armory of early modern European states as they dealt with their creditors.
In an environment of zero or near-zero interest rates, creditors have an incentive to “extend and pretend” – that is, roll over their maturing debt, so that they can keep their problems hidden for longer.
A predictable funding problem was left unresolved until the moment when creditors would be least likely to present a united front, and most likely to give in to pressure to undertake crisis-management measures.
A debtor’s negotiating strategy is to make creditors believe that a collapse would produce some much bigger catastrophe, which can be avoided only by more concessions and more support.
In the process, a basic principle of modern capitalism – that when debtors cannot pay back creditors, a fresh start is needed – has been overturned.
Even former creditors benefited from this rebound.
The more Argentina grew, the more it paid to its former creditors.
Argentina’s interests and those of its creditors were thus aligned: both wanted growth.
But the creditors are equally to blame – they lent too much and imprudently.
The risk of default or debt restructuring induces creditors to be more careful in their lending decisions.
When a sufficient proportion of creditors agree to a restructuring plan (in the case of Argentina, the holders of more than 90% of the country’s debt did), the others can be forced to go along.
For current-day Greece, the imposition of “voluntary” losses on the country’s private creditors represents just the end of the beginning.
On the face of it, the “voluntary” arrangement with creditors might appear to have been a big success.
The delay in reaching an agreement enabled most private creditors to escape the consequences of their reckless lending to Greece.
Had Greece defaulted on its debt in 2010, imposing the same “haircut” on private creditors as it has imposed now, it would have reduced the debt-to-GDP ratio to a more manageable 80%.
These supporters also argue, with some justice, that Argentina’s crisis results in part from a self- fulfilling prophesy among creditors.
As it stands, every country that has implemented an austerity program without imposing losses on private creditors has more debt now than when it started.
In 1992, Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, allowed private bank equity holders to be wiped out, but it rescued depositors and creditors by buying up risky assets of failing institutions.
As for Europe, the Kirchner’s have not yet paid off Argentina’s debt – pending since the default – to the Paris Club of sovereign creditors.
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