Creditors
in sentence
1217 examples of Creditors in a sentence
In effect, these instruments turn
creditors
into shareholders in a country’s economy, entitling them to a portion of its future profits while temporarily reducing its debt burden.
The
creditors
and bondholders who lent the money in the first place must carry their share of the burden, for the sake of the PIIGS, the EU, and their own bottom lines.
The goal would not be to rescue banks and their creditors, but to minimize the disruption that an uncontrolled default might cause.
When a large financial institution is insolvent, the IMF should take it over, guaranteeing its short-term obligations, but wiping out the shareholders and repaying the long-term
creditors
only after all the other
creditors
(including the IMF itself) are repaid.
First, rigid rules that wipe out shareholders and penalize long-term
creditors
are a clear deterrent from bankers’ point of view.
Such proposals were widely discussed in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, and IMF Deputy Managing Director Anne Krueger pushed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism that would have offered a legal path to imposing general haircuts on creditors, thereby ending the collective-action problems that impede the efficient resolution of sovereign bankruptcy.
That way, the debtor countries can reassure their
creditors
and repay their loans with self-printed cash if necessary, as Southern European countries have done for the last decade.
To counter this tendency, Keynes advocated replacing any system in which “the process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor” with one in which the force of adjustment falls symmetrically upon debtors and
creditors.
In negotiations with its
creditors
this spring, Greece recognized this, insisting that its debt be reduced.
Though the United States and the IMF privately sided with Greece, Germany prevailed, as
creditors
usually do.
Yet
creditors
sometimes prevail to their own detriment; by pushing the debtor to the breaking point, they end up bringing about a complete default.
The country’s
creditors
should now negotiate a consensual debt reduction through some combination of lower (and fixed) interest rates, reduced face value of debt, and very long maturities.
In fact, hardline demands by the country’s US government
creditors
after World War I contributed to deep financial instability in Germany and other parts of Europe, and indirectly to the rise of Adolf Hitler in 1933.
First, I recommend that the Greek people give a resounding “No” to the
creditors
in the referendum on their demands this weekend.
Second, Greece should continue to withhold service on its external debts to official
creditors
in advance of a consensual debt restructuring later this year.
But nor does a country go bankrupt without serious mistakes by its
creditors
– first in lending too much money, and then in demanding excessive repayments to the point of the debtor’s collapse.
In the old days – think of the 1980’s Latin American debt crisis – one could get creditors, mostly large banks, in a small room, and hammer out a deal, aided by some cajoling, or even arm-twisting, by governments and regulators eager for things to go smoothly.
But, with the advent of debt securitization,
creditors
have become far more numerous, and include hedge funds and other investors over whom regulators and governments have little sway.
In fact, the ECB may be putting the interests of the few banks that have written credit-default swaps before those of Greece, Europe’s taxpayers, and
creditors
who acted prudently and bought insurance.
And when times are bad, for example in a crisis episode, losses are transferred to
creditors.
The implementation and impact of Syriza’s agenda, especially its decisive economic program, will depend on the new government’s ability to maintain support at home and compromise with Greece’s
creditors
abroad.
The problem for Greece is that its
creditors
may adopt a very tough stance.
After all, private
creditors
hold only a minimal share of Greek debt nowadays.
Greece’s
creditors
and partners, for their part, must provide the fiscal space needed for the reforms to work.
Outside shareholders had little influence over the powerful individuals who ran the chaebol, and
creditors
lent money freely, assuming that the leading chaebol were too important for the government to allow them to go bankrupt.
Had the government placed AIG into Chapter 11 reorganization in November 2008, AIG’s creditors, including its derivative counterparties, would have ended up with the value of AIG’s assets, which consisted mainly of shares in AIG’s insurance subsidiaries.
Without necessarily affecting the operations of AIG’s insurance subsidiaries, the reorganization process would have simply shifted ownership of AIG’s assets from AIG’s existing shareholders to AIG’s
creditors.
To the extent that the value of these assets would not have been sufficient to cover all of the derivative creditors’ claims, they would have had to bear some losses.
In the future, governments should not bail out failing financial institutions’ derivative counterparties, even when they provide a safety net to some of these institutions’
creditors
(such as depositors).
A governmental commitment to exclude derivative
creditors
from any safety net extended when financial institutions fail would reduce future costs to taxpayers from cases like AIG.
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