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Booms in sentence

228 examples of Booms in a sentence

Temporary commodity booms typically pull workers, capital, and land away from fledgling manufacturing sectors and production of other internationally traded goods.
They also are frequently lured away from manufacturing by booms in construction and other non-tradable goods and services.
Moreover, there is still slack in real-estate markets where booms went bust (the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Dubai).
In the Middle East, for example, both Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 were preceded by unprecedented oil-price booms, implying greater prosperity in the region.
Many governments increase spending excessively in booms, and then are forced to cut back in downturns, thereby exacerbating the cyclical swings.
The measured loss of competitiveness in southern Europe thus should not be ascribed to a lack of structural reforms or unreasonable trade unions, but rather booms in domestic demand, fueled mainly by the easy availability of cheap credit for consumption (Greece) and construction (Spain, Ireland).
This caused interest-rate differentials between various countries to shrink, which generated real-estate booms in the weaker economies and reduced their competitiveness.
Of course, these indicators do have a legitimate role to play in explaining housing markets, but they are simply not adequate to account for the recent booms.
After the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, interest rates plummeted, fueling private-sector credit booms in many of the largest emerging markets, including Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey.
Although these booms were initially financed by domestic capital, they soon became dependent on foreign capital, which flowed into their economies as advanced-country central banks pumped huge amounts of liquidity into financial markets.
But the recent worldwide increase in commodity prices has meant that the traditional regional powerhouses of Chile, Brazil, and Mexico have experienced economic booms of their own.
One of its leading deities is the “efficient market hypothesis” – the belief that the market accurately prices all trades at each moment in time, ruling out booms and slumps, manias and panics.
Aside from waning procyclicality, macroprudential policies and capital controls appear to help restrain the intensity of aggregate credit booms and asset bubbles, with policies in place during the boom enhancing economic resilience during the bust.
Since the late eighteenth century, there have been seven or eight booms in non-oil commodity prices, relative to the price of manufactured goods.
The booms typically lasted 7-8 years, though the one that began in 1933 spanned almost two decades.
Commodity-price booms are usually associated with rising incomes, stronger fiscal positions, appreciating currencies, declining borrowing costs, and capital inflows.
If China’s economic slowdown persists – as those following investment booms and fueled by debt overhangs often do –the commodity downturn is likely to continue, as no other economy is capable of picking up the demand slack.
Rather, the main problem with oil booms is that they give rise to a series of pathologies--rent seeking, patronage, corruption, plunder--that corrode vital domestic public institutions and undermine governance.
Each and every one of the recent booms and busts – in Latin America, Asia, and Russia in the 1990’s, and in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and Ireland more recently – shared some combination of unsustainably low financial costs, asset bubbles, over-indebtedness, wage growth unwarranted by productivity gains, and domestic absorption in excess of production.
And that, too, is a feature of a market dominated by small traders: the “herding” behavior that fuels major booms and busts becomes more prevalent, because individuals assume that others have better information.
Back then, Europeans complained that low interest rates in America were driving global inflation; now low US interest rates are blamed for driving irresponsible asset-price booms.
Poor governance limits a country’s ability to create lasting wealth and productive capacity – even if the shortcomings become evident and damaging only when booms turn to busts.
Stock-market booms don’t die of old age; they are generally killed by higher interest rates.
Beneath the surface, huge imbalances were building up, resulting in debt-fueled real-estate booms in the euro periphery.
Scratch the surface, and you found high growth rates driven not by productive transformation but by domestic demand, in turn fueled by temporary commodity booms and unsustainable levels of public or, more often, private borrowing.
Cheap external finance, plentiful capital inflows, and commodity booms helped hide many such shortcomings and fueled 15 years of emerging-market growth.
A country like Israel booms with economic confidence, but is full of self-doubt when it comes to strategic and political considerations.
The Irish and Spanish property booms are prime examples of this.
And debt can drive booms and busts in the price of existing assets: the UK housing market over the past few decades is a case in point.
The weaker countries enjoyed real-estate, consumption, and investment booms, while Germany, weighed down by the fiscal burden of reunification, had to adopt austerity and implement structural reforms.
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