Bailout
in sentence
528 examples of Bailout in a sentence
This is the historical analogy drawn by those who want governments to do more, particularly banks that feel vulnerable and desperately need a public
bailout.
In these circumstances, a loan from the European Stability Mechanism – the eurozone’s
bailout
fund – would merely provide fuel for even higher outflows.
Such debt levels are sustainable as long as investors continue to assume that another
bailout
is just around the corner.
It made another mistake in designing a bank
bailout
that gave too much money with too few restrictions on too favorable terms to those who caused the economic mess in the first place – a policy that has dampened taxpayers’ appetite for more spending.
The
bailout
exposed deep hypocrisy all around.
And then the government, too, was induced to engage in decreasingly transparent forms of
bailout
to cover up its largesse to the banks.
In the year-and-a-half since South Korea received a $57billion IMF bailout, and the 13 months since former dissident Kim Dae Jung became president, the currency (the won) has stabilized, short-term debts have been rolled over into long-term ones, foreign reserves have increased, and interest rates have been cut.
Even though the US government is doing other things as well –fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing, and other uses of
bailout
funds – it is not doing everything it should.
At the beginning of the crisis, Greece’s European creditors eschewed debt relief and charged punitive interest rates on
bailout
funds.
Puerto Rico doesn’t need a
bailout.
Instead of restructuring the manifestly unsustainable debt burdens of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs), politicians and policymakers are pushing for ever-larger
bailout
packages with ever-less realistic austerity conditions.
The legislation was not intended to ban derivatives, but only to bar implicit government guarantees, subsidized by taxpayers (remember the $180 billion AIG bailout?), which are not a natural or inevitable byproduct of lending.
With investment risks largely collectivized by the
bailout
measures instituted by the ECB and the eurozone’s member governments, investors are once again accepting low yields, and borrowers are seizing the new opportunities.
The critical limit beyond which creditors become anxious has been raised significantly by the
bailout
architecture put in place over the last two years.
There are many who would solve the problem by routing more and more cheap credit through public channels –
bailout
funds, eurobonds, or the ECB – from the eurozone’s healthy core to the troubled South.
And
bailout
fatigue is emerging in the eurozone core.
The eurozone was founded on the “no bailout” principle: if member states could not repay their debts, lenders would bear the losses.
But the Western European
bailout
packages could make the situation in emerging Europe worse.
But, again, although derivatives trading played an important role in the crisis (AIG’s inability, without a government bailout, to honor its risky credit-default swaps is the best example), Glass-Steagall’s repeal did not unleash the riskiest trades in the institutions that failed.
The total up-front financing would be €530 billion by 2020 – less than the cost of the current US financial-sector
bailout
plan – and €810 billion by 2030, which is well within range of what financial markets can handle.
Even the extravagant
bailout
of financial giant Citigroup, in which the US government has poured in $45 billion of capital and backstopped losses on over $300 billion in bad loans, may ultimately prove inadequate.
But when Obama’s running mate, Joe Biden, was asked, in his debate with his Republican counterpart, Sarah Palin, what proposals an Obama-Biden administration might have to scale back as a result of the $700 billion Wall Street bailout, the only specific proposal he mentioned was the increase in foreign assistance.
The fiscal compact – formally the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union – was the quid pro quo for Germany to approve the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was essentially a collective
bailout
package.
Europe has so far stuck to the mutualization model, in which individual states’ debts are underwritten by a common central bank or fiscal
bailout
system, ensuring security for investors and largely eliminating interest-rate spreads among countries, regardless of their level of indebtedness.
The
bailout
fund created last year by the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank to enable Greece and other distressed sovereigns, like Ireland and now Portugal, does exactly that, but on the condition that they implement austerity programs to eliminate their deficits over a short period of time.
European governments, moreover, have used the G-20 in a highly instrumental fashion, with the largest share of the
bailout
funds agreed under the G-20 rubric having gone to middle-income states in or around Europe.
French banks had by far the biggest exposure to distressed Southern European countries, and thus benefited the most from the
bailout.
The ECB’s
bailout
initiatives climaxed with the introduction of quantitative easing (QE), whereby the Eurosystem’s central banks purchased €2.3 trillion ($2.8 trillion) in freshly printed euro securities – including government bonds worth €1.8 trillion – between 2015 and 2017.
And political pressure from the United States prevented its weak government from renegotiating a
bailout
program that even the International Monetary Fund knew was unrealistic.
The
bailout
request did not succeed because it could not muster a simple majority of the states (represented by the Senate) and the population (represented by the House of Representatives) under the normal decision-making procedure (the “Community method,” in European Union jargon).
Back
Next
Related words
Government
Which
Financial
Would
Banks
Billion
Crisis
Their
Country
Countries
After
There
Program
Funds
Could
Package
Should
Creditors
Austerity
System