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Asset in sentence

1608 examples of Asset in a sentence

The banking system is not primarily suffering from a temporary breakdown of the inter-bank market and a transitory decline in asset values that could be overcome simply by waiting for recovery.
It may pile up in bank reserves or savings accounts, or it may produce asset bubbles.
What started as a problem with sub-prime mortgages has now spread to houses more generally, as well as to other asset classes.
Raising interest rates on bank deposits, which are now negative in real terms, would reduce incentives for individuals to pour money into equity markets or real estate, mitigating the risk of asset market bubbles and boom-bust cycles in the economy.
First, wealth effects are statistically small; most studies show that only about 3-5 cents of every dollar of asset appreciation eventually feeds through to higher personal consumption.
As a result, outsize gains in asset markets – and the related risks of new bubbles – are needed to make a meaningful difference for the real economy.
Second, wealth effects are maximized when debt service is minimized – that is, when interest expenses do not swallow the capital gains of asset appreciation.
All of this means that the wealthiest 10% of the US income distribution benefit the most from the Fed’s liquidity injections into risky asset markets.
And yet, despite the significant increases in asset values traceable to QE over the past several years – residential property as well as financial assets – there has been little to show for it in terms of a wealth-generated recovery in the US economy.
Yes, asset markets were initially ecstatic over the Fed’s decision this month not to scale back QE.
Of course, some of the better-managed emerging-market economies will continue to experience rapid growth and asset outperformance.
All of its asset purchases will be sterilized, meaning that their monetary-policy effects will be offset.
This has kept short- and long-term interest rates low (and even negative in some cases, such as Europe and Japan), reduced the volatility of bond markets, and lifted many asset prices (including equities, real estate, and fixed-income private- and public-sector bonds).
But, over time, the longer central banks create liquidity to suppress short-run volatility, the more they will feed price bubbles in equity, bond, and other asset markets.
True, easy money did help to restore equity prices, but it might also have created new asset bubbles.
This dynamic is similar to that of an asset bubble, albeit faster.
Our book shows that deflating asset bubbles, particularly in housing markets, pose a serious danger to the financial system.
The ECB bailout program has enabled the people of the peripheral countries to continue to live beyond their means, and well-heeled asset holders to take their wealth elsewhere.
Without the additional money that GIPS central banks created in excess of their countries’ requirements for internal circulation, trade deficits could not have been sustained, and the GIPS’ commercial banks would have been unable to prop up asset prices (which all too often were those of government bonds).
Europe, too, will get a bloody nose if it keeps trying to artificially prop up asset prices in the periphery.
An asset diet rich in equities and direct investment and low in debt cannot substitute for other elements of fiscal and financial health.
But our current unwholesome asset diet is an important component of risk, one that has received far too little attention in the policy debate.
All these suggestions highlight what might be any secretary general’s most important asset: his voice.
The proposals have been disparaged as the “nationalization of private assets,” a “pension swindle,” and “an asset grab worthy of Lenin or Stalin.”
One must always remember: pensions are ultimately a claim on future output, whether in the form of a tradable financial asset or a legally binding commitment of the state.
We tend to be uncomfortable with the notion that an economy’s fundamentals do not determine its asset prices, so we look for causal links between the two.
So if the price of a financial asset is not guided – at least for some periods – by fundamentals, where does that leave central banks?
On one hand, central banks cannot be so relaxed that they will permit asset prices to go anywhere as a result of self-fulfilling expectations.
On the other hand, central banks are not in the business of controlling asset prices.
A final disclaimer: believing that fundamentals do not always pin down asset prices is not the same as believing they are irrelevant, much less that current US fundamentals are in good shape.
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