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Asset in sentence

1608 examples of Asset in a sentence

I am convinced that we need an overall cap on leverage on banks’ balance sheets, regardless of risk asset weightings or value at risk measurements.
The fact that Tawang, the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama and a major monastery of Tibetan Buddhism, lies in Arunachal, deprives China of a vital asset in its attempts to assert total control over Tibet.
This, together with technological innovations and the deployment of sidelined corporate cash, would unleash productive capacity, producing faster and more inclusive growth, while validating asset prices, which are now artificially elevated.
But, while risk aversion and volatility were falling and asset prices were rising, economic growth remained sluggish throughout the world.
This gap between Wall Street and Main Street (rising asset prices, despite worse-than-expected economic performance) can be explained by three factors.
But there were two risks to liquidity-driven asset reflation.
First, if growth did not recover and surprise on the upside (in which case high asset prices would be justified), eventually slow growth would dominate the levitational effects of liquidity and force asset prices lower, in line with weaker economic fundamentals.
The EU’s greatest asset is Ukraine, whose citizens are willing to die in defense of their country.
As Premier Wen Jiabao recently emphasized, China must now undertake comprehensive measures to control mounting inflation, growing asset bubbles, and an overheating economy.
Rather, we now know that Japan’s economic difficulties were caused by the growth, and then collapse, of a huge asset bubble, and the failure to use monetary policy to prevent deflation after the bubble burst.
But to use that expertise – the most valuable asset a globally competitive financial institution has – investors need to control the operations of firms in which they have a stake.
If desirable real estate is in scarce supply, credit creation and allocation can at times be driven not by rational analysis of alternative investment projects, but by self-reinforcing cycles in which more credit drives asset prices higher, which then sustains expectations of further rises, leading to more borrowing demand and credit supply.
From asset bubbles and excess leverage to currency suppression and productivity impairment, Japan’s experience – with lost decades now stretching to a quarter-century – is testament to all that can go wrong in large and wealthy economies.
The danger all along has been that open-ended unconventional monetary easing would fail to achieve traction in the real economy, and would inject excess liquidity into US and global financial markets that could lead to asset bubbles, reckless risk taking, and the next crisis.
The global economy has been driven in recent years by remarkable speculative asset booms and busts, which bring into the equation questions of confidence and trust, as well as fairness.
They see little reason to believe that current asset values and trade flows are not sustainable.
The current-account deficit is equal to the trade deficit plus the cost of servicing the net international asset position: the net rent, interest, and dividends owed to foreigners who have invested their capital in the US.
As deficits accumulate, the cost of servicing the net international asset position grows.
Strong economic performance reflects strong domestic demand in the US, owing to low borrowing costs and rising asset prices.
TOKYO – The US Federal Reserve’s gradual exit from so-called quantitative easing (QE) – open-ended purchases of long-term assets – has financial markets and policymakers worried, with warnings of capital flight from developing economies and collapsing asset prices dominating policy discussions worldwide.
In search of higher yields, investors took that liquidity – largely in the form of short-term speculative capital (“hot” money) – to emerging markets, putting upward pressure on their exchange rates and fueling the risk of asset bubbles.
The researchers Cynthia Wu and Fan Dora Xia estimate that the US Federal Reserve’s open-ended asset purchases (so-called quantitative easing, or QE) have led to an effective US policy rate of -1.6%.
And, with Americans facing a debt overhang, rapidly increasing unemployment (and the worst unemployment compensation system among major industrial countries), and falling asset prices, they are likely to save much of the tax cut.
Moreover, the EU has a somewhat paradoxical asset at its disposal: it is not a Pacific power and does not carry the burden of great-power status in Asia.
The eurozone’s flagging growth reflects old and new structural problems, the legacy of the last crisis (which still weighs on banks’ asset quality), high debt levels in some countries, and external shocks that have affected demand.
Inflation is increasing beyond what can be explained by rising commodity and food prices, while credit growth and some asset prices are starting to look high relative to historical standards.
Rapid normalization – like that undertaken in the space of a year in 1994 – would crash asset markets and risk leading to a hard economic landing.
But a slow exit risks creating a credit and asset bubble as large as the previous one, if not larger.
Some at the Fed – Chairman Ben Bernanke and Vice Chair Janet Yellen – argue that policymakers can pursue both goals: the Fed will raise interest rates slowly to provide economic stability (strong income and employment growth and low inflation) while preventing financial instability (credit and asset bubbles stemming from high liquidity and low interest rates) by using macro-prudential supervision and regulation of the financial system.
Either the Fed pursues the first goal by keeping rates low for longer and normalizing them very slowly, in which case a huge credit and asset bubble would emerge in due course; or the Fed focuses on preventing financial instability and increases the policy rate much faster than weak growth and high unemployment would otherwise warrant, thereby halting an already-sluggish recovery.
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